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Abstract 
The effects of electoral rules on party systems have been well known since Duverger first 
proposed his famous law. Often considered ‘second order’ in terms of issues and voting 
behaviour, many European Parliament elections are held under different electoral rules to 
national elections. This article examines the consequences of these differences and 
hypothesizes that where a more permissive electoral system is used for European 
Parliament elections, the size of the party system at European Parliament elections will 
grow towards what we would expect from the European Parliament electoral rules in 
isolation, and that this will lead to a subsequent growth in the size of the national party 
system. Using multilevel mixed-effect growth curve modelling support is found for both 
these hypotheses. 
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On June 7, 1979 a unique experiment in electoral democracy began. Over the next four days 
voters from each of the (then) nine members of the European Community cast their ballots 
in the first direct elections for the European Parliament. The 1979 election – the first ever 
international election – marked not just a significant milestone in European integration but 
also the beginning of an important opportunity for the study of elections and voting 
behaviour. Shortly after the first European Parliament election Reif and Schmitt (1980) 
proposed their now famous ‘second order election’ hypothesis: that in the absence of any 
real power to change the forces that govern European integration (because such power lies 
outside the European Parliament), voters will cast their votes largely according to domestic 
political concerns. Seven European Parliament elections (a total of 146 country-election 
observations across 28 countries) and much scholarly attention later, Reif and Schmitt’s 
argument continues to frame research into European Parliament elections.  
Many of the issues surrounding European Parliament elections have been well explored, 
especially questions of voting behaviour (e.g. Hix and Marsh, 2007, 2011; Hobolt et al., 
2009; Marsh, 1998; Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 2005; Stockemer, 2012). One area that has been 
under studied is how national party systems have been affected by elections that are held at 
the national level (even if the institution filled by those elections is a supranational body) 
with a different electoral systems to those used for national parliamentary elections. This 
article argues that the impact of these ‘second order electoral rules’ follows a simple 
Duvergerian logic: where the electoral system used for European Parliament elections is 
more permissive (i.e. has a greater district magnitude) than that used at national elections, 
the size of the party system at European Parliament elections will grow over successive 
elections to what we would expect from the more permissive electoral system. The growth 
in party system at the European Parliament level will also feed back into the national party 
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system, as existing and new parties use European Parliament elections to help overcome 
some of the obstacles they face from the national electoral system. These effects occur 
because European Parliament elections are held under more permissive rules and provide 
an arena where the costs of coordination between voters and elites are lower than the 
national level, facilitating changes to national party systems. 
That this might be the case is easy to see from a cursory glance at the evidence. In the first 
European Parliament elections in 1979, four parties won seats in (West) Germany and four 
party tickets (covering 5 parties) won seats in France. At the 2014 European Parliament 
elections 15 parties won seats in Germany and six party tickets (covering 13 parties) won 
seats in France.1 Similarly, several small parties, such as the French and British Greens, first 
achieved representation in the European Parliament before going on to win seats in the 
national legislature. 
In order to examine these arguments more systematically this article first outlines the 
existing literature on European integration, electoral rules, and party systems before 
drawing on the more general literature on electoral system effects to develop a theory of 
why European Parliament electoral rules will have an impact on national party systems. The 
theory is then tested using multilevel mixed-effects growth curve modelling, which confirms 
the arguments developed here.  
                                                     
1 The German case is exaggerated by the German Constitutional Court’s ruling that first a 5%, and then a 3%, 
electoral threshold was illegal. Seven parties achieved more than 5% of the vote in 2014, a rise of 3 since 1979 
and a rise of two since the first European Parliament elections held following reunification in 1994.  
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European integration, electoral rules and party systems 
With scholars primarily focusing on electoral behavior at European Parliament elections, the 
effects of European Parliament electoral systems have been neglected. There are of course 
exceptions: Kousser (2004) argues that when the rules governing European Parliament 
elections are less of a barrier to small parties than national electoral systems, voters will 
alter their voting strategies accordingly. Farrell and Scully (2005) investigate how differing 
electoral formula lead to differing electoral outcomes, focusing on differences between 
member-states rather than the difference between national and European Parliament 
elections. Shifting the focus away from the elections themselves, Hix (2004) has shown that 
whether MEPs are elected by open or closed lists is a good predictor of voting behaviour in 
the European Parliament. Similarly, Hix and Hagemann (2009) have investigated the effects 
of different electoral systems on the link between voters and MEPs. With these exceptions, 
the impact of differing electoral systems, particularly in the classical Duvergerian sense of 
the number of parties winning votes, has been overlooked. 
That this is the case is perhaps understandable. If we accept that European Parliament 
elections are largely second order elections we might simply expect the party system 
resulting from European Parliament elections to continue to resemble that of the national 
party system. Alternatively we might expect any resulting change in the size of the party 
system at the European Parliament level to result from voters using elections which have no 
impact on the composition of government to cast protest votes for fringe parties and so be 
unrelated to any difference in electoral systems between the national and European 
Parliament level. In essence this is the conclusion reached in the influential study by van der 
Eijk and Franklin (1996) who argue that the success of small parties in European Parliament 
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elections can largely be attributed to strategic context rather than the electoral system. 
Although they do not grant the same role to the electoral system as is proposed here, van 
der Eijk and Franklin (1996) suggest that by granting small parties an arena in which to 
compete, over the long-term European Parliament elections might impact national party 
systems by increasing the number of alternatives available to voters.  
The prevailing wisdom however is that European integration in general has had a limited 
impact on national party systems (e.g. Mair, 2000). There are two areas where scholars have 
argued that European integration has had an impact on national party systems, and neither 
of them suggests an increase in the size of party systems. First, because many policy areas 
are now decided at the European level, European integration has restricted the policy space 
in which parties can compete (Ladrech, 2002; Mair, 2007a, 2007b, 2013). Secondly, because 
of the number of decisions taken in intergovernmental meetings and the fact that parties 
have not yet come up with mechanisms in response to this development, European 
integration has increased the power of executives vis-à-vis their parties (Poguntke et al., 
2007; Raunio, 2002). There is also a clear consensus that European integration has not had a 
major impact on national party systems in terms of the political cleavages on which parties 
compete: many scholars agree that party competition over Europe may have the potential 
to redraw the lines of party competition, but for the moment at least, it has not actually 
done so (de Vries, 2007; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). 
Whilst the above may be true, this articles argues that because scholars have tended to look 
for some sort of ‘European’ impact of European integration on party systems they may have 
missed an important effect of European Parliament elections on national party system – the 
growth of the size of party systems proposed here. This article examines the effect of 
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European Parliament elections simply qua elections rather than specifically as part of the 
process of European integration, and remains agnostic to the question of whether these 
changes reflect any ‘Europeanisation’ of national party systems. In order to understand why 
party systems may change as a result of European Parliament elections it is necessary to 
turn to the literature on the effects of electoral systems. 
 
Electoral systems and the size of party systems 
In the 1950’s the French sociologist Maurice Duverger (1954)  first proposed what has since 
become known as Duverger’s law and hypothesis: that the plurality electoral rule tends to 
result in a two-party system (law) and that more proportional systems tend to result in 
multipartism (hypothesis). This basic insight has been expanded, systematized, and 
generalized by many scholars in the ensuing decades and has become a cornerstone of 
electoral research (Clark and Golder, 2006; Cox, 1997; Riker, 1982; Taagepera and Shugart, 
1989; Taagepera, 2007). In its generalized form, Duverger’s findings have come to mean 
that that the higher the district magnitude, the larger the resulting party system.2   
As expressed by Cox (1997), Duvergerian effects arise because of the needs of voters and 
elites to strategically coordinate their electoral behaviour so as not to waste their vote or 
candidacy by supporting a losing party. As district magnitude increases an electoral system 
becomes more ‘permissive’ in the sense that it reduces the costs of electoral coordination – 
a smaller number people need to coordinate their preferences in order for a candidate to 
win – and so facilitates the entry of smaller and new parties to the electoral arena. 
                                                     
2 For the sake of simplicity, the term ‘Duvergerian effects’ is used here to refer to these generalized effects 
that capture both the ‘law’ and ‘hypothesis’.  
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Coordinating preferences at elections is difficult for two reasons – everyone votes at 
approximately the same time and vote choices remain unknown until after the end of the 
election. Prior elections provide a wealth of information to voters about the preferences of 
their fellow citizens and which parties are likely to be successful in future elections.  
For this reason, when a new electoral arena like the European Parliament is introduced we 
would expect the already established party system to provide the starting point for electoral 
competition. If the electoral system used in the new electoral arena is approximately the 
same as that used in national elections then we would expect little or no difference to 
emerge between the new and existing party systems. However if, following the logic of 
Duverger, we expect the electoral system used in the new arena to produce a party system 
size that is different to the existing party system (that is Duvergerian effects apply equally to 
national and European parliamentary elections) then over successive elections the resulting 
electoral party system might move from being very similar to the existing party system to 
what we would expect from the electoral system used for the new arena, as elites and 
citizens adjust to the new rules at play. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: When the electoral system used at European Parliament elections is 
more permissive than that used in national elections, the size of the party system at 
European Parliament elections will grow over successive elections as a function of the 
electoral rules used in European Parliament elections.   
There are two reasons why support for hypothesis 1 might not be found. One, there might 
be no change in the size of the party system over consecutive European Parliament 
elections and two, that the size of the party system at European Parliament elections does 
increase but that change may be unrelated to differences in electoral rules and instead a 
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result of the second order nature of European Parliament elections. If this is the case it 
suggests that the Duvergerian effects of electoral rules might not apply to second order 
elections or that Duvergerian effects of electoral systems do not exist more generally.  
 
Duvergerian effects and second order elections 
It is easy to understand why the second order nature of European Parliament elections 
might be an obstacle to the theory put forward here: a plausible corollary of European 
Parliament elections being decided primarily by domestic political concerns is that party 
systems will continue to resemble existing national party systems. Electoral systems do not 
operate directly on party systems, rather they facilitate the actions of political elites and 
voters. We must look to the motivations of both to understand how electoral rules facilitate 
party system change.  
If elites have no interest in altering the existing party system and/or voters have no interest 
in shifting their support for existing parties, then we will observe no change in the resulting 
party system, regardless of the electoral system. If however a sufficient number of people 
decide that they wish to support a new electoral party (or alter the balance of power 
between the existing parties) then the ease with which they can do so will be determined by 
the electoral rules at play.  
If the electoral system at European Parliament elections is the same as at national elections 
then elites and voters may find that the party system is already ‘full’, making the entry of a 
new party difficult. A more permissive set of electoral rules at the European Parliament level 
introduces a gap between the existing party system and the potential party system (as 
determined by the electoral system), allowing space for the entry of new parties. The 
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motivations for elites and voters at European Parliament elections may well be second order 
in the sense that they are motivated by domestic rather than European political concerns. 
Whether they are or not does not affect the theory presented here (though it may 
determine which parties are supported). The theory here simply assumes that some new 
party or parties wish to enter the party system or existing parties wish to alter the balance 
of the party system (or both), and that voters are willing to support them. If these 
assumptions do not hold then the predicted growth of the party system will not occur. The 
existence of parties which have entered representative politics at European Parliament 
elections and the fact that voters have voted for them suggests that these assumptions are 
not unreasonable.  
If the above is correct and support is found for hypothesis 1, the increase in the size of the 
party system at European Parliament elections in some countries will also have implications 
for our understanding of the role of European Parliament elections in national politics. If the 
Duvergerian effects of electoral systems apply in an absolutely strict fashion then we would 
not expect any change to party systems at the national level as the party system will already 
be ‘full’. If this is the case, it would have a serious implication for the second order election 
paradigm as it would suggest that the party system at European Parliament elections was 
becoming decoupled from the national party system. However understanding different 
elections as connected occasions in which elites and voters must coordinate their 
preferences, and the role that electoral systems play in that process, suggests that this will 
not happen, and that the national party system will grow alongside the European Parliament 
party system.  
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Just as European Parliament elections are not run in isolation from national elections, 
neither are national elections run in isolation from European Parliament elections. European 
Parliament elections may weaken the effects of a less permissive national electoral systems, 
in a similar fashion to the ‘contamination’ effects that the proportional tier of a mixed 
electoral system has on voting at the plurality level (Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Herron and 
Nishikawa, 2001). If European Parliament elections are primarily concerned with domestic 
politics then it should not be surprising if people look to European Parliament elections for 
information about the preferences of others with regard to national politics. If European 
Parliament elections are run under more permissive electoral rules than national elections 
then this will facilitate the entry of new parties (or the growth of support for existing 
parties) into national politics because European Parliament elections provide an arena in 
which the potential supporters of such parties can coordinate their preferences at a lower 
cost than in national elections. The ‘second order’ nature of European Parliament elections 
may even further lower the cost of coordination because the cost of a ‘wasted’ vote will be 
smaller in the low stakes arena of the European Parliament. The existence of this secondary 
arena in which to coordinate electoral preferences may help overcome the Duvergerian 
effects of a more restrictive national electoral system and the size of the resulting party 
system at the national level may outstrip what we would expect from the national electoral 
system in isolation. This leads to hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: If the size of the party system at European Parliament elections 
increases then this will lead to a corresponding increase in the size of the party 
system at national elections.   
 
11 
 
Electoral systems and party systems 
Although the Duverger effects of electoral systems are some of the most widely cited and 
examined ideas in the study of elections, its validity has recently been questioned. Some 
scholars have argued that the frequently observed correlation between the permissiveness 
of an electoral system and the size of a party system occurs not because of any effects of 
the electoral system but that electoral systems are in fact endogenous to party systems 
because they are originally chosen by the parties which run in those elections (Boix, 1999; 
Colomer, 2005). Although the historical basis of some of these arguments has been 
criticized (e.g. Kreuzer, 2010), it is not necessary for the theory proposed here to dispute the 
argument that in most cases electoral systems are endogenous to party systems. It is only 
necessary to disagree with the implication of this argument – that the fact electoral systems 
are largely endogenous to party systems means that there are no electoral system effects as 
proposed by Duverger. Here endogeneity is just as much of a problem for those who argue 
that there are no Duvergerian effects: they cannot directly address the question of what 
would happen if an electoral system was imposed exogenously.  
European Parliament elections provide a unique opportunity to examine the Duvergerian 
effects of electoral systems because although the electoral systems used in European 
Parliament elections are ultimately decided by the member states and so do not entirely 
overcome the endogeneity problem, the choice of electoral system in European Parliament 
elections is at least influenced by exogenous factors such as European Union law and seat 
allocation in the European Parliament.  
Throughout the history of European integration, various attempts have been made to 
introduce uniform electoral procedures to elect the European Parliament. Long before the 
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first European Parliament elections were held, article 138(3) of the Treaty of Rome (1958) 
declared that: 
“The Assembly [European Parliament] shall draw up proposals for elections 
by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure… The 
Council shall… lay down the appropriate provisions, which it shall 
recommend to Member States for adoption...” 
Despite several proposals from the then European Parliament, it was not until 1976 that the 
Council finally agreed to implement the direct election of the European Parliament. The 
design and adoption of ‘uniform procedure’ was deferred until a later date and in the 
meantime electoral procedures were left to the discretion of member-states.  
After repeatedly failing to reach agreement on any uniform procedures the general principle 
was reasserted in the Maastricht Treaty (Section E, Article 40 of the provisions amending 
the Treaty of Rome) before being amended by the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 38) to include 
the watered down provision that European Parliament elections be held using “uniform 
procedure… or in accordance with principles common to all Member States [emphasis 
added]”. In 2002 the European Parliament and Council finally agreed these principles: that 
elections to the European Parliament would be held using some form of proportional 
representation, that member-states were free to establish constituencies provided they did 
not affect proportionality, and that electoral thresholds could not exceed 5%. At the time of 
the agreement this simply affirmed the status quo of arrangements for electing MEPs. 
Importantly however, this decision restricted the choice of electoral system for European 
Parliament elections available to member-states joining the EU after 2002.  
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More importantly however, one determinant of the permissiveness of the electoral system 
used in each member-state is established exogenously: the number of seats each member-
state has in the European Parliament. The number of MEPs allocated to each member-state 
has been negotiated in the various EU treaties but is essentially determined in proportion to 
relative population size. This, combined with the decision of most member-states to 
implement a single national constituency, has been a pivotal factor in determining the 
district magnitude of the electoral system used for European Parliament elections.  
European Parliament elections provide the perfect opportunity to test the arguments of 
those who have disputed the causal effects of electoral systems. For example, Colomer 
(2005) argues that the growth of a party system occurs before the introduction of a more 
proportional electoral system and will not continue to grow following its introduction: the 
only effect of the permissiveness of an electoral system is to reinforce existing party 
systems. If hypothesis 1 is correct and the European Parliament party system size of those 
member-states using more permissive electoral systems does increase (which contradicts 
what would be predicted by Colomer), it will show not only the effects of European 
Parliament elections but also the more general validity of the Duvergerian effects of 
electoral systems.  
 
Data and Methodology  
Analysis is conducted in two stages on a dataset of the (at time of writing) 145 times a 
European Parliament election has been held in an EU member-state between 1979 and 
2014 (excluding, because it has only held one election, Croatia) and the 102 domestic 
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elections that have followed European Parliament elections.3 The first stage analyses the 
effects that differences in electoral systems have on the size of the party system at 
European Parliament elections. The second stage analyses the effect that changes in the size 
of the party system at the European Parliament level has on the size of the party system at 
the national level.  
Data was gathered on the mean district magnitude and size of party system, measured using 
Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) effective number of electoral parties (𝑁𝑉), for each European 
Parliament and national election. The effective number of electoral parties rather than the 
effective number of parliamentary parties is used because the main concern of this analysis 
is how voters are cast, rather than how those votes are translated into seats.  Data on the 
effective number of electoral parties is taken from the ParlGov database (Döring and 
Manow, 2012) supplemented by new calculations for more recent elections. Data on mean 
district magnitude at national elections is taken from Bormann and Golder (2013). Mean 
district magnitude for each European Parliament election are new calculations based on 
official information. Summary statistics for the size and change in the effective number of 
electoral parties and district magnitude are shown in table 1. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
The dependent variable for the analysis is the effective number of electoral parties at each 
election. As the size of the party system at the European Parliament level is expected to 
grow from the existing national party system, the model also includes the effective number 
of parties at the national election preceding each country’s first European Parliament 
election.  
                                                     
3 This excludes Luxembourg from the analysis of the effects of European Parliament elections on the party 
system as European Parliament and national elections are held simultaneously.   
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Following the literature on electoral systems the effect of district magnitude is expected to 
have diminishing returns as district magnitude increases, which suggests a log 
transformation of district magnitude (e.g. Taagepera and Shugart’s (1989) 𝑁𝑉 =
1.25 (2 +  log 𝑀) ± 1). The variable measuring the difference in the permissive of the 
electoral systems used in European Parliament and national elections is calculated by 
subtracting the logged national mean district magnitude from the logged European 
Parliament mean district magnitude. The intuition behind this calculation is that the same 
difference in district magnitude will have more of an effect on the European Parliament 
party system when the district magnitude at national elections is low than when it is higher. 
For example, having a district magnitude of four at European Parliament election and a 
plurality electoral system at the national level (log 4 −  log 1 = 1.39) will have more impact 
than a district magnitude of 14 at the European Parliament will have on an national system 
with a district magnitude of 11 ((log 14 −  log 11 = 0.24).  
The analysis at the European Parliament level is conducted using a multi-level mixed effects 
growth curve modelling approach (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012: 343–349). This 
method models change in the dependent variable as a function of a time variable (in this 
case, the number of European Parliament elections that each country has had) which is 
allowed to vary at the country level, producing an equation of the development of each 
party system over successive European Parliament elections for each country. The multi-
level growth curve approach accounts for between country differences that are likely to 
affect the change in size of party system (such as the ‘demand’ for new parties) with country 
level random effects, enabling the construction of a parsimonious model that only includes 
time and electoral system variables at the fixed effects level.  
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In order to determine the appropriate shape of the growth curve, a non-parametric (local 
polynomial regression) analysis is conducted on the data. The results for European 
Parliament party systems, shown in figure 1, suggest that most of the change in the 
effective number of electoral parties occurs between a country’s third and sixth elections, 
with the curve approximating a logistic function with the point of maximum growth 
occurring around the fourth election.   
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The non-parametric curve is closely approximated in a parametric analysis by centring the 
variable measuring the number of European Parliament elections on the fourth election and 
transforming it with a logistic function (where x is the European Parliament election 
variable): 
𝑓(𝑥) =  
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝑥−4)
 
A comparison of model fit between models specified with a linear, quadratic and logged 
European Parliament election variables confirms the superiority of this approach.  
The first step in each stage of the analysis is a simple growth curve model which models 
changes in party system size for each country as a function only of time, which provides a 
base point for model comparison. The second step introduces the measure of district 
magnitude difference. Changes in party size at the European Parliament level are expected 
to manifest themselves over successive elections, with diminishing returns as the European 
Parliament party system reaches that expected from the European Parliament electoral 
system, suggesting an interaction between the time and the difference between district 
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magnitude variables, which is added to the model in the third step of analysis. In summary, 
the fixed effect portion of the model is specified as follows: 
𝑁𝑉 𝐸𝑃 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝛽1𝑁𝑉 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+  𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑) × 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
The fourth stage of analysis introduces a set of control variables which might also plausibly 
explain the change in the size of European Parliament party systems – differences in 
electoral thresholds between national and European Parliament elections, differences in 
turnout between national and European Parliament elections, and change to the size of the 
national party system between European Parliament elections. 
The effect of an increase in European Parliament party system size is expected to operate 
more directly on national elections, with changes at a European Parliament election 
impacting on the size of the party system at the next national election. The second stage of 
analysis models the impact of European Parliament party system size on national elections 
following European Parliament elections by including the national party system size before a 
European Parliament election and the size of the party system at the European Parliament 
election in a multilevel model, controlling for changes to electoral system at the national 
level using the same difference of log magnitudes measure used for European Parliament 
elections. The fixed effect portion of the model is specified as follows: 
𝑁𝑉 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑃 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝛽1𝑁𝑉 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑃 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑉 𝐸𝑃 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
 𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒  
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Results 
The results for stage one of the analysis, investigating the change in the size of the party 
system at European Parliament elections, are shown in table 2. Model 1 shows a growth 
curve model of change in the size of the party system without accounting for electoral 
system differences and finds a statistically significant average growth coefficient, indicating 
an average growth of party system size across European Parliament elections. The model 
predicts that there has been an average growth from a party system size of 4.7 effective 
electoral parties to 6.1 effective electoral parties across eight European Parliament 
elections, an average of 0.17 additional effective electoral parties per election, though this 
effect is non-linear, with the largest period of growth occurring between the third and sixth 
elections.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 2 adds the variable measuring the difference between the European Parliament and 
national electoral systems to the model as an initial test of the effect of electoral system 
differences. The coefficient is statistically significant and positive, indicating that the 
difference between electoral systems has on average increased the size of the party system 
at European Parliament elections.  
Model 3 introduces the interaction term between the variables measuring the number of 
elections and differences in electoral systems and shows that as expected, the interaction 
between the two is statistically significant. Figure 2 illustrates this interaction and shows the 
marginal (average across all countries) effect of the difference between the electoral 
systems at the European Parliament and national level. Figure 2 shows that a one unit 
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increase in the difference between the logged European Parliament mean district 
magnitude and the logged national mean district magnitude (i.e. an electoral system at the 
European Parliament level that has a mean district magnitude that is e times greater than 
the national mean district magnitude) is predicted to lead to a growth of 0.81more effective 
electoral parties across the eight European Parliament elections than if the electoral 
systems were the same, an average growth of 0.1 effective parties per election, though 
again the effect is nonlinear and occurs mostly between the third and sixth election 
elections.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
An alternative way of visualizing these results is by comparing what the expected party 
system would be at the first European Parliament election and after eight European 
Parliament elections for different levels of district magnitude differences between national 
and European Parliament electoral systems. These results are illustrated in figure 3, which 
shows that at the first election there is very little effect of different electoral systems but by 
the eighth election a clear difference has emerged. As the European Parliament electoral 
system becomes more permissive than the national electoral system, the expected 
difference in the size of the party system after eight elections increases, with an effective 
doubling in the size of the size of the party system predicted for the largest level of 
difference between electoral systems. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 4 adds the three control variables to the model. Neither different levels of turnout 
nor differences in electoral thresholds have a statistically significant effect on the size of the 
European Parliament party system. Unsurprisingly, changes to the national party system 
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(which may result from prior changes to the European Parliament part system, as examined 
in the second part of the analysis) also affect the European Parliament party system, though 
these do not affect the size nor statistical significance of the impact of any of the variables 
included in model 3.   
These results offer support for hypothesis one: the size of the party system at European 
Parliament elections grows at as a function of the differences between electoral systems 
used at European Parliament and national elections. It is also important to note that the 
main effect of time is also statistically significant in model 3. This indicates that although the 
party system in member-states with a more permissive European Parliament electoral 
system grow more than those who use a more comparable electoral system, even those 
with equivalent electoral systems are predicted to grow by 0.79 effective electoral parties 
over eight European Parliament elections, suggesting that as well as an effect of district 
magnitude there is also a more general ‘European Parliament’ effect on the size of the party 
system. 
The final model provides a very accurate estimation of the changes in European Parliament 
party system size. Figure 4 illustrates the predicted and observed changes in the size of the 
European Parliament party system size (for reasons of space and because the older 
member-states have had more elections and so are more illustrative of the results, 
restricted to the 15 pre 2004 EU members). Two countries in particular are worth examining 
in more detail because of changes introduced to the European Parliament electoral system 
in each country after several European Parliament elections had already been held: France 
and the UK. Between 1979 and 1999 France conducted European Parliament elections with 
a single national constituency, with a mean district magnitude of 83.4 across the 5 elections. 
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In 2004 France introduced eight regional constituencies, with a mean district magnitude of 
9.75. Following the logic of the Duvergerian effects of electoral systems we would expect 
this to result in a reduction in the size of the party system, which is both what is predicted 
by the model and observed in the data.    
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The UK offers the opposite case. The four European Parliament elections held prior to 1999 
were held using single member districts elected by a plurality voting rule (except for 
Northern Ireland, which elected its three MEPs in a single constituency by Single 
Transferable Vote, and continues to do so). In 1999 a more proportional electoral system 
was introduced, with 12 regional constituencies electing an average of 7.25 MEPs each 
(falling to 6 by 2009 due to a reduction in the number of British MEPs). Again, following the 
logic of the Duvergerian effects of electoral systems we would expect this to result in a 
change to the size of the party system, this time an increase in the effective number of 
electoral parties, which is what is predicted by the model and observed in the data.  
The results for stage two of the analysis, investigating the feedback effect of change in the 
size of the party system at European Parliament elections on the size of party system at the 
national level, are shown in table 3. The results show that, accounting for prior party system 
size at the national level, the size of the European Parliament party system statistically 
significantly effects the size of the national Party system, supporting hypothesis 2. The effect 
of changes to national district magnitude is not statistically significant, though this is likely 
due to the fact that for the vast bulk of cases the electoral system is reasonably stable and 
large differences are only observed for a handful of cases. These impact of the party system 
at the European Parliament level are illustrated in figure 5. Each additional effective 
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electoral party at the European Parliament level is expected to result in an additional 0.23 
effective electoral parties at the national level. This suggests that although the European 
Parliament party system does feed back into the national party system as expected, the 
relationship is not simply a case of one for one substitution and that the European 
Parliament party system may be acting as a more expansive parallel national party system.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Conclusion 
This article set out to analyze two questions: does the electoral system used in European 
Parliament election affect the size of the party system at European Parliament elections, 
and do changes to the size of the party system at the European Parliament level feed back 
into the party system at the national level. The evidence strongly supports an affirmative 
answer to both of these questions. Where more permissive electoral systems are used for 
European Parliament elections there has been more growth in the size of the party system. 
The growth of European Parliament party systems has in turn led to an increase in the size 
of party systems at national elections.  
It is important not to overstate these results. The analysis here does partially support the 
earlier argument put forward by van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) that the success of new 
parties and the resulting change in the size of the party system can be attributed to the 
strategic context of European Parliament elections: regardless of differences in electoral 
systems between the national and European Parliament level, party systems tend to grow 
over consecutive European Parliament elections. Where the present analysis differs to the 
earlier analysis by van der Eijk and Franklin is the finding that electoral systems do have an 
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influence on changes to party systems: party systems tend to grow more when the electoral 
system used for European Parliament elections is more permissive than that used for 
national elections. 
That this is the case is an important finding for scholars of both European Parliament 
elections and electoral systems more generally. Although a great deal of attention has been 
paid to voting behaviour in European Parliament elections, the importance of the 
relationship between national and European Parliament electoral systems has been 
overlooked by most of the existing scholarship.  
These findings also have important implications for European democracy. Some scholars, 
most notably Peter Mair (2007a, 2007b, 2013), have argued that the process of European 
integration has narrowed the lines of political competition because it shifts political 
competencies away from the arena of national electoral competition, undermining the 
foundations of political representation through political parties. The findings here suggest 
that there may be reasons to be more optimistic about the future of representative 
democracy in Europe. This is not to disagree with Mair’s prescient diagnosis of the crisis of 
European political parties, simply that as well as source of decline, European integration 
may also prove a facilitator of renewal. By providing an arena in which there is less need to 
vote strategically, European Parliament elections assist the entry of new parties and the 
redistribution of support between existing parties, providing a possible remedy to decline of 
the traditional party system.  
Following the fourth European Parliament election, van der Eijk, Franklin, and Marsh (1996) 
argued that the unique nature of European Parliament elections provide an important 
comparative resource that can give us insights into not just how voters make decisions on 
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the European level but how the institutional and contextual factors condition vote choices 
more generally. The findings here have two implications for more general research on the 
effects of electoral rules. First, it supports the general validity of Duvergerian effects against 
those who have argued that we only observe the correlation between electoral and party 
systems because of endogeneity. When the implementation of electoral rules is influenced 
by exogenous factors, as is the case in European Parliament elections, we observe changes 
to party systems along Duvergerian lines.  
Second, the questions raised here about the impact that electoral rules for second order 
elections have on national party systems have implications for more general research on the 
effects of electoral systems. Elections and electoral systems are often studied as if they exist 
in a vacuum. Although European Parliament elections may be unique as supranational 
elections, many countries have experiences with using different electoral systems for 
different elections, whether for different chambers of parliament, for presidents and 
legislatures, or regional and local elections. How these different elections interact in 
determining political outcomes is a neglected area of the study of politics, which has tended 
to assume that only the electoral system for the most important political arena matters. The 
results here suggest that we may have been wrong to do so: the electoral rules of ‘second 
order’ elections may well have important consequences for first order politics. 
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Figure 1. Local polynomial regression fit of the change in the effective number of electoral 
parties at European Parliament elections.  
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Figure 2. Predicted difference in the effective number of parties at European Parliament 
elections when the difference between the logged European Parliament mean district 
magnitude and the logged national mean district magnitude is one across eight European 
Parliament elections. 
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Figure 3. Predicted effective number of electoral parties at the first and eighth EP election 
by the degree of differ between the district magnitude of the European Parliament and 
national electoral systems.  
 
 
  
31 
 
Figure 4. Predicted and observed changes to the effective number of electoral parties at 
European Parliament elections for the pre-2004 EU member-states. 
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Figure 5. Predicted and observed changes to the effective number of electoral parties at 
national elections following European Parliament elections for the pre-2004 EU member-
states. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for party system size and differences in electoral district 
magnitude between European Parliament and National elections.  
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Effective number of electoral 
parties before first EP election 
4.51 1.67 
Mean change in EP Effective 
number of electoral parties 
0.98 1.3 
Mean change in domestic 
Effective number of electoral 
parties 
0.49 1.14 
Difference in Mean district 
magnitude between EP and 
national elections 
3.23 46.15 
Number of EP elections 3.67 2.19 
 
Table 2. Results from multilevel mixed-effect growth curve models analysing changes in 
party system size at European Parliament elections. Random effects not shown. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Effective number of electoral parties before first 
EP election 0.770*** 0.867*** 0.822*** 0.869*** 
 
(0.0893)    (0.103)    (0.0982)    (0.102)    
EP election number (transformed) 1.477*** 1.454*** 0.848    0.931*   
 
(0.337)    (0.346)    (0.516)    (0.489)    
EP - national district magnitude difference 
 
0.275*** 0.0646    0.0477    
  
(0.0949)    (0.111)    (0.112)    
Election X Magnitude difference interaction 
  
0.760*** 0.743*** 
   
(0.231)    (0.220)    
Change in Effective number of electoral parties 
at prior domestic election 
   
0.408*** 
    
(0.119)    
EP - national turnout difference 
   
0.00806    
    
(0.00833)    
EP - national electoral threshold difference 
   
0.0171    
    
(0.0610)    
Constant 1.316*** 0.763    1.079**  1.102**  
  (0.436)    (0.510)    (0.489)    (0.535)    
N 145    145    145    145    
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Table 3. Results from multilevel model analysing changes in party system size at national 
elections following European Parliament elections. Random effects not shown. 
  Model 5 
National Effective number of electoral 
parties prior to EP election 0.599*** 
 
(0.0970)    
Effective number of electoral parties 
EP 0.245*** 
 
(0.0913)    
Constant 0.684**  
  (0.297)    
N 102    
Statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
